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ABSTRACT 
Fraudsters periodically attempt to enrich themselves by employing a raft of tricks and 
schemes to exploit investors and financial markets. Market manipulation (‘manipulation’) is 
one such class of illegitimate conduct. It perverts the market price formation process and 
undermines public confidence in financial market integrity. An effective prohibition on 
manipulation is thus required to protect investors from fraud and promote market integrity, 
thereby fostering investment and economic growth.  
Chapter 1 of this thesis defines manipulation and argues that the current anti-manipulation 
regime, ss 1041A–1041C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), requires substantive reform. 
This regime is predicated on a conceptually unsound understanding of manipulation. It fails 
to articulate the nature and role of manipulative intention and is based on an unclear 
distinction between civil penalties and criminal offences. As such, the scope of liability is 
sometimes too broad and at other times too narrow. Additionally, the provisions are internally 
defective, as they suffer from ambiguous language. They are also overly complex and have 
inconsistent physical and fault requirements. The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) exacerbates 
these problems.  
Chapter 2 advances a two-pronged proposal for substantive law reform. Principally, two 
criminal prohibitions on manipulation should replace the current regime. These will prohibit 
a person from executing a transaction, or doing, or omitting to do, an act, when motivated by 
the dominant purpose of manipulating the market for, or price of, a financial product. The 
provisions clearly articulate the requisite manipulative intention and have an appropriate 
scope of liability. They are also easier to enforce than the current regime, as two deeming 
provisions facilitate proof of manipulative intention.  
4 
The proposed regime is complemented by a Serious Financial Market Crimes Act 2014 
(Cth). This contains prohibitions on manipulation and other conduct that undermines 
financial market integrity, reinforcing the serious criminal nature of manipulation and 
enhancing the credibility of ASIC’s enforcement actions. It may also motivate Parliament to 
articulate its policy objectives in greater detail. Together, these proposals would effectively 
deter manipulation and promote financial market integrity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Because they play a central role in the economy, financial markets affect the standard of 
living of all Australians.1 They drive capital investment and economic growth, thereby 
supporting job creation, fostering business confidence and stimulating increased production. 
Most working-age Australians indirectly own shares through their superannuation fund, the 
value of which is determined by the performance of financial markets. Financial markets also 
perform less visible, but equally important, functions. They enable companies to raise capital, 
facilitate the pricing and transfer of financial products, and allow financial risk to be hedged.2 
These economic benefits are maximised if the price of listed securities is determined by the 
fair, transparent and competitive interplay of market forces in an efficient market.3 At the 
same time, fraudsters have an immense profit incentive to use manipulative schemes to 
pervert the market price and exploit market processes. Tomes of ingenious manipulative 
techniques fill the academic literature, cataloguing the vast array of schemes designed to 
improperly exploit prevailing market structures, regulation and technology.  
The public interest strongly favours a robust prohibition on manipulation that protects 
investors from fraud and facilitates the fair and competitive interplay of market forces. Any 
such prohibition must not be overly broad, as this would deter socially beneficial trading 
activity and stifle financial market innovation.  
                                                
1 Paul Constable, ‘Ferocious Beast or Toothless Tiger? The Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation 
in Australia’ (2011) 8 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 54, 78. 
2 Gordon Walker and Brent Fisse, Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed, 1995) 103. 
3 Ibid 133–34. 
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Modern Australian financial markets are highly regulated and generally perceived as fair and 
efficient.4 However, in the last few years, the adequacy of the current anti-manipulation 
regime, ss 1041A–1041C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), has been challenged. The 
sensational market abuses of the global financial crisis have highlighted the perennial risk of 
widespread and sophisticated manipulation. This risk will continue to increase,5 enabled by 
changing market structures, technology, the identity of market participants, and the global 
interconnectedness of capital markets.6 As such, it is crucial that the prohibition on 
manipulation is conceptually sound, has an appropriate scope of liability, and is sufficiently 
flexible to remain effective in response to changing circumstances.  
This thesis builds on the existing academic literature by providing a sustained criticism of the 
current anti-manipulation regime and proposing a model for substantive law reform. The 
scope of the thesis is limited to manipulation by transactions, acts and omissions. 
Manipulation by false or misleading statements is not considered, as this raises different 
issues and such statements are extensively regulated independent of them being 
manipulative.7  
                                                
4 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) Chairman Tony D’Aloisio, ‘Insider 
Trading and Market Manipulation’ (Speech delivered at the Supreme Court of Victoria Law 
Conference, Melbourne, 13 August 2010) 5–6. 
5 Constable, ‘Ferocious Beast’, above n 1, 63; Ian Tunstall, International Securities Regulation 
(Thomson Reuters, 1st ed, 2005) 148. 
6 Mark McGinness, ‘Regulatory Models for Protecting the Markets: An Australian Perspective’ 
(2001) 9 Journal of Financial Crime 40, 51; Steve Thel, ‘$850,000 in Six Minutes — The Mechanics 
of Securities Manipulation’ (1994) 79 Cornell Law Review 219, 240. 
7 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, ‘Aspects of Market Integrity’ (Report, June 2009) 
7, 10; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1041E, 1041H. For a recent example, see ASIC, ‘Criminal 
Charge against Jonathan Moylan’ (Media Release, 13-187MR, 23 July 2013).  
7 
Practical reforms to evidence-gathering powers, trial procedures and sentencing will play an 
important role in the practical effectiveness of the proposed regime. However, they are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Chapter 1 mounts the case for substantive law reform by assessing the conceptual soundness 
and effectiveness of the current regime. This analysis is necessarily detailed and technical, 
reflecting the complexity of the issues and the practical application of the current provisions. 
Chapter 2 advances two proposals for substantive law reform, providing a detailed discussion 
of each proposal and its benefits.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) has an ongoing 
responsibility to protect Australian financial markets from manipulation. This requires ASIC 
to use innovative detection and enforcement methods to keep pace with the constantly 
evolving raft of manipulative schemes. A robust prohibition on manipulation must underpin 
this fight and is critical to successful enforcement actions. Unfortunately, as will be shown, 
the current anti-manipulation regime is conceptually unsound and ineffective. A case will be 
made that substantive law reform is required to equip ASIC with the tools to combat 
manipulation and effectively protect financial markets and investors. 
A Definition of Financial Market Manipulation 
The definition of manipulation and its precise scope are in a contested state of flux.8 
However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to highlight several core features.  
                                                
8 See generally Robert Baxt, Ashley Black and Pamela Hanrahan, Securities and Financial Services 
Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2012) 652; Hui Huang, ‘Redefining Market Manipulation in 
Australia: The Role of an Implied Intent Element’ (2009) 27 Company and Securities Law Journal 8, 
14; Daniel R Fischel and David J Ross, ‘Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial 
Markets?’ (1991) 105 Harvard Law Review 503, 506–10; William D Harrington, ‘The Manipulation 
of Commodity Futures Prices’ (1981) 55 St John’s Law Review 240, 248; David C Donald, 
‘Regulating Market Manipulation through an Understanding of Price Creation’ (2011) 6 National 
Taiwan University Law Review 55, 64; Robert A Jarrow, ‘Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, 
and Short Squeezes’ (1992) 27 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 311, 312; Emilios E 
Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed, 2005) 116; Eva Lomnicka, ‘Preventing and Controlling the Manipulation of 
Financial Markets: Towards a Definition of “Market Manipulation”’ (2001) 8 Journal of Financial 
Crime 297, 298; Matthijs Nelemans, ‘Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation’ (Discussion 
Paper, Tilburg University, January 2008) 12 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078423>; Wendy Collins 
Perdue, ‘Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense’ (1987) 56 Fordham Law Review 
345, 348; Vivien R Goldwasser, Stock Market Manipulation and Short Selling (CCH Australia and 
Centre for Corporate and Securities Regulation, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, 1st ed, 
1999) 99–102. 
9 
Manipulation is a class of illegitimate conduct comprising a variety of techniques. It perverts 
the market price formation process and thus undermines financial market integrity.9 
Fundamentally, as Justice Mason noted in his seminal judgment in North v Marra 
Developments (1981), manipulation causes the market price to reflect the manipulator’s 
concerted efforts.10 It ceases to be the product of the free and competitive interplay of the 
forces of genuine supply and demand.11 More precisely, manipulation perverts the price 
formation process by setting, maintaining or causing an unjustified change in the market 
price, introducing false information into the market, or creating a false or misleading 
appearance of genuine trading activity.12  
Persons who detrimentally trade, or refrain from trading, due to manipulation are directly 
harmed.13 So too are persons who realise an asset, or trigger a contractual obligation, on less 
advantageous terms than if manipulation had not occurred.14 Manipulation of a company’s 
share price may also place pressure on that company.15 All market participants are indirectly 
harmed by reduced price efficiency, wider bid–ask spreads16 and lower liquidity.17 More 
                                                
9 Avgouleas, above n 8, 155; Ministry of Economic Development of New Zealand, ‘Reform of 
Securities Trading Law: Market Manipulation Law’ (Discussion Document, May 2002) 17, 35; 
Donald, above n 8, 64. 
10 North v Marra Developments Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 42, 59.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Avgouleas, above n 8, ch 4; Paul Latimer, ‘False Trading and Market Rigging on the Stock 
Exchange’ (1999) 7 Asia Pacific Law Review 247, 247–48. 
13 Ahmad Alkhamees, ‘Private Action as a Remedy against Market Manipulation in the USA’ (2012) 
20 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 41, 43; Arthur F Mathews, Securities Litigation 
under the Federal Securities Laws (Practicing Law Institute, 1977) vol 1, 376; R v Chan (2010) 79 
ACSR 189, 194 [22]. 
14 Thel, ‘$850,000 in Six Minutes’, above n 6, 232–34; R v Chan (2010) 79 ACSR 189, 194 [22]. 
15 Constable, ‘Ferocious Beast’, above n 1, 79. 
16 Rebecca Söderström, ‘Regulating Market Manipulation: An Approach to Designing Regulatory 
Principles’ (Working Paper, Uppsala Faculty of Law, 2011) 8, 10. 
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generally, the economy is harmed through suboptimal capital allocation.18 Finally, the 
perceived risk of manipulation reduces public confidence in the integrity of the market price, 
meaning that these adverse effects may persist after the manipulation has ended.19 As such, 
courts have recognised a strong public interest in prohibiting manipulation.20 
At its core, manipulation is defined as an act, trade or omission that is carried out with a 
manipulative intention.21 Proof of a manipulative intention is the defining feature of 
manipulation and is both necessary and sufficient for the act, trade or omission to be 
manipulative. 22 The nature and role of manipulative intention depend on the manipulative 
technique used and whether the manipulator targets the ‘market price’ or the ‘market’.  
The ‘market price’ can be targeted directly or, for a derivative contract (such as a future), by 
manipulating the underlying asset. It is sufficient that the manipulator intended to set or 
maintain, or cause an unjustified change in, the market price of the financial product or, for a 
derivative contract, the underlying asset.23 For example, a trader might buy securities for the 
                                                                                                                                                  
17 ASIC Commissioner Belinda Gibson, ‘Improving Confidence and Integrity in Australia’s Capital 
Markets’ (Speech delivered at the Committee for Economic Development of Australia, Sydney, 8 July 
2008) 3. 
18 Tunstall, above n 5, 186; D’Aloisio, ‘Insider Trading’, above n 4, 3–4. 
19 D’Aloisio, ‘Insider Trading’, above n 4, 3–4. 
20 North v Marra Developments Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 42, 59.  
21 Avgouleas, above n 8, ch 4. 
22 Fischel and Ross, above n 8, 506, 510; Goldwasser, Stock Market Manipulation, above n 8, 110; 
Huang, above n 8, 16–18.  
23 Avgouleas, above n 8, ch 4. 
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dominant purpose of ensuring that the day’s closing price for the security does not fall below 
the level at which a margin lender will require additional capital on a margin loan.24  
There are several ways to target the ‘market’. Most commonly, this occurs when the 
manipulator intends to create a false or misleading appearance of genuine trading activity.25 
For example, a group of persons might repeatedly trade a security between themselves to 
falsely simulate the appearance of trading activity.26 Other characteristics of the market, such 
as liquidity, can also be manipulated. This might occur if a manipulator withholds shares 
from the market with the intention of constraining liquidity.27 Finally, a manipulator may 
intentionally interfere with the market price formation process, such as by flooding the 
market with bids or offers with the intention of cancelling them before execution to slow the 
price formation process.28 
Many common manipulative techniques are readily identifiable.29 For illustrative purposes, 
two of them — wash sales and marking the close — are described below.  
A wash sale occurs when a person simultaneously offers to sell and buy a security that they 
already own. Thus, while a trade is reported to have occurred, there is no change in beneficial 
                                                
24 Facts based on DPP (Cth) v JM (2013) 87 ALJR 836, 839 [4]–[7]. 
25 Braysich v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 434, 470 [97] (Bell J dissent, Heydon J agreeing); Braysich 
v The Queen (2009) 260 ALR 719, 726 [26], 739 [77]. 
26 Paul Redmond, Corporations and Financial Markets Law (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2013) 922–
23. 
27 Ashley Black, ‘Regulating Market Manipulation: Sections 997–999 of the Corporations Law’ 
(1996) 70 Australian Law Journal 987, 995. 
28 Matt Prewitt, ‘High-Frequency Trading: Should Regulators Do More’ (2012) 19 Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 131, 147–48. 
29 Appendix 1 defines common manipulative techniques.  
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ownership in the security.30 This creates a false or misleading appearance of trading activity, 
which is intended to mislead investors about the level of market demand for the security.31 
This might induce investors to detrimentally purchase or sell the security at manipulated 
volumes or prices.32 Wash sales are themselves manipulative and may also be part of 
complex manipulative schemes. For example, a manipulator could execute wash sales at 
increasing prices to falsely simulate buying activity. This may induce genuine buyers to enter 
the market, thereby exacerbating the price trend and allowing the manipulator to profit.33  
Marking the close occurs when a person makes bids or buys shares at or near the close of 
trading for the purpose of achieving a specific closing price.34 The market price then reflects 
the manipulator’s concerted effort, rather than the forces of genuine supply and demand.35 
This may be done to trigger on more beneficial terms a contractual right, such as a futures 
contract or contractual performance bonus, that is tied to the price of the manipulated 
security.36 For example, a fund manager might bid up the price of securities at the end of the 
quarter to inflate the performance of their investment portfolio and so earn a higher 
commission.37  
                                                
30 Redmond, above n 26, 922–23. 
31 Avgouleas, above n 8, 127. 
32 Constable, ‘Ferocious Beast’, above n 1, 76; Eugene V Rostow, ‘Market Manipulation and the 
Securities Exchange Act’ (1937) 46 Yale Law Journal 624, 626–29, 636. 
33 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Financial Market Supervision) Bill 2010 
(Cth) 63. 
34 Redmond, above n 26, 922–23. 
35 Vivien R Goldwasser, ‘Regulating Manipulation in Securities Markets: Historical Perspectives and 
Policy Rationales’ (1999) 5 Australian Journal of Legal History 149, 179. 
36 Thel, ‘$850,000 in Six Minutes’, above n 6, 228–31. 
37 Constable, ‘Ferocious Beast’, above n 1, 71–72. 
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It is worth noting that there is ongoing peripheral debate about whether new techniques, 
especially those facilitated by high-frequency trading, are manipulative.38 However, this 
question is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
B Assessment of the Current Anti-Manipulation Regime 
Having defined manipulation, attention now turns to whether it is effectively prohibited by 
the current regime. This section of the thesis provides an overview of ss 1041A–1041C of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), followed by a detailed analysis of each provision, before 
considering the application of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and the civil 
penalty/criminal offence distinction.  
1 Overview of the Anti-Manipulation Prohibitions 
The current regime comprises three independent prohibitions that are not to be read down by 
reference to each other.39 They provide that a person must not: 
• (i) take part in, or carry out (whether directly or indirectly), a transaction or 
transactions that (ii) have, or are likely to have, the effect of creating or maintaining an 
artificial price for trading in a financial product: s 1041A;  
• (i) do, or omit to do, an act if that act or omission (ii) has, or is likely to have, the effect 
of creating, or causing the creation of, a false or misleading appearance of40 (iii) active 
                                                
38 Eugene Clark, ‘The Legal Tortoise and the High Frequency Trading Hare: The Challenge for 
Regulators’ (2011) 25 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 274, 291–92; Söderström, above n 16, 
20; ASIC Commissioner Shane Tregillis, ‘Dark Pools, HFT and Competition’ (Speech delivered at 
the Stockbrokers Association of Australia Conference 2011, Sydney, 26 May 2011) 10–11.  
39 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041J. 
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trading in financial products41 or (iv) with respect to the market for financial products 
or (v) with respect to the price for trading in financial products:42 s 1041B(1); or 
• (i) enter into, or engage in, a fictitious or artificial transaction or device if that 
transaction or device (ii) results in the price for trading in a financial product 
fluctuating,43 or being maintained, inflated or depressed: s 1041C(1).  
Each prohibition is a financial services civil penalty provision44 and a criminal offence. To 
establish a civil penalty contravention, ASIC must prove, on the balance of probabilities,45 
the physical elements specified above by the roman numerals. To establish a criminal 
offence, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions must prove, beyond reasonable 
doubt,46 the physical elements and corresponding fault elements implied by the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth).47 The maximum penalty for an individual for civil penalty 
contravention is a $200,000 pecuniary penalty order48 and for criminal contravention is 10 
years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of the greater of $450,000 or three times the value of the 
benefit reasonably attributable to the offence.49 
                                                                                                                                                  
40 The proscribed effects are alternatives: Australian Securities Commission v Nomura International 
Plc (1998) 89 FCR 301, 367. 
41 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041B(1)(a). 
42 Ibid s 1041B(1)(b). 
43 Ibid s 1041C(1)(b). 
44 Ibid ss 1317E, 1317S.  
45 Ibid ss 1317L, 1322. 
46 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 13.2(1).  
47 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1308A; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6. 
48 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1317E, 1317G(1A), 1317G(1B). 
49 Ibid ss 1311(1), 1311(3), sch 3 item 310. 
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It is also prohibited for a person to spread information about the occurrence of a manipulation 
where that person or their associate has committed the manipulation or would benefit from 
spreading the information.50 This is intended to limit the harm caused by manipulation. 
Before considering the sections in detail, three points should be noted. First, the sections 
apply to a ‘person’.51 This includes natural persons and corporations,52 and is not limited to 
registered market participants. Second, the conduct must affect a financial product on a 
financial market53 operated in Australia.54 It does not matter where the manipulator is located 
or the impugned acts take place. Third, the sections apply uniformly to securities and futures 
markets, as the definition of financial product expressly includes securities55 and futures.56 
2 Critique of ss 1041A and 1041B 
Section 1041A prohibits a person from (i) taking part in, or carrying out (whether directly or 
indirectly), a transaction or transactions that (ii) have, or are likely to have, the effect of 
creating or maintaining an artificial price for trading in a financial product.57 ‘Transaction’ 
means an act or doing, negotiating or dealing with something or ‘an affair, a piece of 
                                                
50 Ibid s 1041D. 
51 Ibid ss 1041A–1041D. 
52 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2, 2C. 
53 Financial market is defined in Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 767A(1). It excludes over-the-counter 
markets (parties negotiate transactions directly) and dark pools (markets without pre-trade price 
transparency): Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 767A(2); Baxt, Black and Hanrahan, above n 8, ch 10. 
54 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 5, 1041A–1041C.  
55 Ibid s 764A(1)(a). 
56 Ibid ss 764(1)(c), 761D. 
57 Ibid s 1041A. 
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business’.58 This includes a legally enforceable transaction,59 placing a bid or offer, and 
instructing a broker or agent to place a bid or offer, irrespective of whether it is executed.60 
Section 1041B(1) prohibits a person from (i) doing, or omitting to do, an act if that act or 
omission (ii) has, or is likely to have, the effect of creating, or causing the creation of, a false 
or misleading appearance of (iii) active trading in financial products61 or (iv) with respect to 
the market for financial products or (v) with respect to the price for trading in financial 
products.62 ‘Act or omission’ encompasses any conduct capable of having the prohibited 
effect, whether occurring on-market or not.63 This includes a statement,64 a transaction65 or 
placing a bid or offer.66  
These sections are defective for several reasons. First, if proof of manipulative intention is 
not necessary to contravene the sections, the scope of liability is too broad. Second, if 
engaging in conduct, or a trade, with a manipulative intention is not sufficient to contravene 
the sections, the scope of liability is too narrow. Third, the court’s construction of artificial 
price and false or misleading appearance of price as dependent on manipulative intention is 
unconvincing and renders these concepts empty.  
                                                
58 Sparks v Berry [2001] QSC 251 at [13]. 
59 Ibid. 
60 R v Manasseh (2002) 167 FLR 44, 56 [33], 65 [57]. 
61 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041B(1)(a). 
62 Ibid s 1041B(1)(b). 
63 Rosenberg v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 117 ALD 582, 600 [75].  
64 Endresz v Whitehouse (1997) 24 ACSR 208. 
65 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Soust (2010) 183 FCR 21. 
66 R v O’Halloran (2000) 182 ALR 431, 452 [81]. 
17 
(a) Objective Effect 
Section 1041A is drafted as if artificial price is an objective effect that can be observed on the 
market and demonstrated to have occurred, independent of proof of manipulative intention. 
Commentators adopting this perspective argue that there is a strong inference that a price is 
artificial if the price cannot be explained based on historical price levels, trends or 
relationships with other assets.67 It was in this vein that counsel for the respondent in 
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v JM (2013)68 argued, pursuant to a Victorian Supreme 
Court of Appeal Decision,69 that an artificial price is created by abusing market power and 
can be objectively distinguished from a natural price by counterfactual economic analysis.70  
Similarly, it might be thought that the effects proscribed by s 1041B(1) can be demonstrated 
by economic analysis or based on the perception of a reasonable market participant.71 
Parliament has endorsed this view by implying that proof of intention is not necessary for 
civil penalty contravention72 and removing ‘intended to have’73 as a sufficient causal nexus.  
                                                
67 For criticisms of this approach, see Benjamin E Kozinn, ‘Great Copper Caper: Is Market 
Manipulation Really a Problem in the Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle?’ (2000) 69 Fordham Law 
Review 243, 261–62; Perdue, above n 8, 367–72. 
68 (2013) 87 ALJR 836. 
69 DPP (Cth) v JM (2012) 267 FLR 238, 306 [309], 315–316 [333]–[335] (Nettle and Hansen JAA) 
held that artificial price requires the misuse of dominant market power, as typified by corners and 
squeezes. This was correctly overturned by the High Court, as it is not supported by the text, structure 
or purpose of the section and would give it limited scope in relation to securities: North v Marra 
Developments Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 42; DPP (Cth) v JM (2013) 87 ALJR 836, 848 [60], 449 [66], 850 
[70].  
70 Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (Cth) v JM [2013] HCATrans 96 (8 May 2013) 3–5 (Mr 
Moschinsky). 
71 For this approach, see Rosenberg v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 117 
ALD 582, 602 [90], 603 [95]; Avgouleas, above n 8, 108. 
72 Commentary on the Draft Provisions, Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (Cth) (Treasury, 
February 2000) 11.10; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Soust (2010) 183 FCR 21, 
41 [80]. 
18 
The possibility of objectively demonstrating a manipulative effect does not accord with the 
mechanics of the price formation process and, in relation to artificial price, was rejected by 
the High Court.74 Nobody directly controls the market price. The market price is determined 
by matching a person’s bid or offer with that of another investor, according to the rules of the 
price formation mechanism.75 All bids and offers are objectively indistinguishable from the 
perspective of the market mechanism, as they are anonymous requests to buy or sell a 
specified volume of securities at a particular price.76  
Similarly, all executed trades are objectively indistinguishable because they are the output of 
the same mechanism. Thus, it is inaccurate to describe a price as artificial, or an appearance 
of price or active trading as false or misleading, if it was produced by the market mechanism 
and the other party was a genuine buyer or seller. Likewise, it cannot be objectively 
demonstrated that a price or trading pattern caused by conduct or an omission created one of 
the effects proscribed by s 1041B(1).  
It follows that artificial price and false or misleading appearance of price are unworkable 
concepts absent proof of manipulative intention. Alternatively, they are premised on an 
unsound belief that trading or conduct can be manipulative absent proof of a manipulative 
intention. This would render the scope of liability too broad. A person could wrongly be held 
                                                                                                                                                  
73 See pages 22–23. 
74 DPP (Cth) v JM (2013) 87 ALJR 836, 848–850.  
75 Redmond, above n 26, 868–69. 
76 Walker and Fisse, above n 2, 106–07. 
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to have manipulated the market merely because their conduct has an unusual effect that is 
inexplicable by reference to historical price trends.77  
(b) Causal Nexus 
The causal nexus ‘have or likely to have’78 implies that engaging in conduct, or trading, with 
a manipulative intention is not sufficient to contravene either section. This is more restrictive 
than previous regimes, which provided that ‘calculated to have’79 or ‘intended to have’80 was 
sufficient for contravention. For example, the superseded futures manipulation provisions on 
which s 1041A is based81 provided that it was sufficient to prove an intention to create an 
artificial price.82  
The current sections are based on an unduly narrow belief that manipulation is only harmful 
if it has an actual or objectively83 likely effect on the market. As will be explained, this is 
incorrect because manipulation is harmful even if it is unlikely to have a demonstrable effect. 
Indeed, a manipulative trade is unlikely to have a demonstrable effect if it is small relative to 
market turnover or if the market is highly liquid.84  
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A trade executed with a manipulative intention introduces into the market false information 
about the level of supply and demand. This undermines the integrity of the market price, 
irrespective of whether the market price or trading volumes are demonstrably affected. The 
price formation process treats a bid or offer as a signal of supply or demand for the security. 
When a manipulator enters a bid or offer with a manipulative intention, they introduce into 
the price formation process information about the level of demand and supply that they 
subjectively know to be false. The process incorrectly treats the bid or offer as reflecting 
genuine demand and supply and so is adversely affected.  
If conduct entered into with a manipulative intention affects the market price or investor 
valuations of the security, then it can be analysed in the same way. If it does not have such an 
effect, then it can be described as a conspiracy to manipulate the market. The conspiracy is 
complete and the manipulator has done all that is within their control to manipulate the 
market when they engage in conduct to pursue their manipulative intention.85 Consequently, 
liability for manipulation should not arbitrarily depend on the conduct having a demonstrable 
effect. More significant is that the maintenance of public confidence in the integrity of the 
market price requires that this conduct be prohibited. 
(c) Manipulative Intention 
Courts have tried to overcome these problems by emphasising the role of manipulative 
intention.86 Artificial price has been characterised by contrasting it with a price brought about 
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by the forces of ‘genuine supply and demand’.87 In Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v 
JM (2013)88 — a decision substantially consistent with earlier authority89 — it was held that 
when a buyer or seller conducts an on-market ASX transaction with the sole or dominant 
purpose of setting or maintaining the price of a listed security, such conduct is, as a matter of 
law, likely to have the effect of creating an artificial price.90  
Similarly, based on the ‘genuine supply and demand’ framework, it has been held that where 
a person trades with the sole or dominant intention of setting or maintaining the price of a 
security, their conduct is, as a matter of law, likely to create a false or misleading appearance 
with respect to the market for, or price of, the security.91 Also, a person who intends to create 
a false or misleading appearance of trading activity will come within s 1041B(1), as it will be 
interpreted as likely to create a false or misleading appearance of ‘active trading’ or with 
respect to the ‘market for’ a financial product.92  
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Courts have reasoned that on-market ASX transactions are made openly and investors are 
entitled to assume that transactions are made between genuine buyers and sellers — in 
particular, that they are not made for the purpose of setting or maintaining the market price.93 
A transaction involving such a purpose is not made between genuine buyers and sellers 
because it would not have been executed but for the manipulative intention.94 Such a 
transaction is wrongly seen as reflecting genuine market forces and so has an impact on the 
market,95 creating an artificial price96 or a false or misleading appearance of price.97 
The forces of ‘genuine supply and demand’ comprise buyers trying to buy financial products 
at the lowest available price and sellers trying to sell financial products at the highest 
realisable price.98 This does not mean that traders must always seek the most economically 
advantageous price or that they cannot legitimately disagree on the value of the security.99 
Traders may legitimately make purchases or sales with ‘indirect or collateral motives, in 
circumstances where the transaction will, to the knowledge of the participants, have an effect 
on the market for, or price of, shares’,100 and markets may ‘suffer from a variety of 
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imperfections, including mismatches of information, without such imperfections destroying 
their integrity’.101 
Unfortunately, the ‘genuine supply and demand’ analysis fails to explain why traders with 
certain intentions are non-genuine, and why their conduct is likely to have the proscribed 
effect. At most, it clarifies that certain trading attitudes and techniques, which might have 
been thought to be manipulative, are not. It follows that it is not manipulative to execute a 
trade that has a price impact;102 value a security differently from other investors by 
considering idiosyncratic factors or employing a different valuation method;103 or buy at a 
premium or sell at below market price because of legitimate collateral motives, such as an 
urgent need for liquidity or stake-building to launch a takeover.104  
These observations do not explain what renders a trader non-genuine. The mere fact that a 
trader does not have the attitudes or use the techniques noted above is not a basis to infer that 
they had a manipulative intention. More fundamentally, the distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate collateral motives is illusionary because an illegitimate collateral motive is 
actually a manipulative intention. Effectively, courts have asserted that a trader with the 
intention of setting or maintaining the price of a security is not a genuine trader.105 This is 
circular, as it is based on the prior conclusion that the trader’s intention is manipulative, and 
the characterisation of this intention as manipulative is not explained by the ‘genuine supply 
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and demand’ framework. To say that a trader with the proscribed intention is non-genuine is 
to say nothing more than that trading with a manipulative intention is prohibited. 
The explanation that a trade involving a non-genuine buyer or seller is likely to create an 
artificial price, or false or misleading appearance of price, is also unconvincing. Courts have 
reasoned that investors misperceive such trades as being the result of genuine market 
forces.106 This assumes that investors perceive trades as only reflecting genuine market 
forces. They might actually recognise that some trades are strategic, or illegitimate, or they 
might not consider the motivation of other traders. Furthermore, it is unclear on what basis 
traders are entitled to assume that other traders have legitimate motivations, as the law neither 
requires traders to disclose their motivations nor makes it illegal to trade with a price 
impact.107 A more convincing explanation is that such a trade is harmful because it introduces 
subjectively false information into the price formation process.108 This does not require an 
assumption about an investor’s perceptions and recognises that harm is caused at the moment 
the trade is executed.  
Even if courts were to adopt the more moderate position that trading with the sole or 
dominant intention of setting or maintaining the price of a security is sometimes likely to have 
the proscribed effect, the scope of liability would be too narrow. As explained above, trading 
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with a manipulative intention should always be sufficient for conduct, or a trade, to be 
characterised as manipulative.109 
The ‘genuine supply and demand’ analysis indicates that a trader with a manipulative 
intention is non-genuine. A transaction involving them creates an artificial, or false or 
misleading, price. It seems that this reasoning would capture a trader whose intention was to 
create a false appearance of trading activity, even though this does not necessarily affect the 
market price and the analysis does not accurately explain why it is prohibited. As such, the 
‘genuine supply and demand’ approach is too broad. 
Finally, the regime is unnecessarily complex because trading with an intention to set or 
maintain the price of a security contravenes both sections. This creates uncertainty regarding 
how ASIC should frame enforcement actions and potentially enables defendants to resist 
prosecution with arguments based on textual differences between the provisions. This is 
further discussed in the next chapter.110 
(d) Omission-Based Manipulation  
It is unclear in what circumstances an omission to act will contravene s 1041B(1). In 
particular, as Parliament has suggested that manipulative intention does not need to be 
proved,111 it remains to be seen how the scope of civil penalty liability will be determined. 
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One possibility is to interpret the section as requiring that the accused had a duty to perform 
the act allegedly omitted, although the section does not indicate when such a duty arises. It 
might occur when the accused’s conduct creates a situation in which a subsequent omission 
to disclose, or delay in disclosing, would mislead or deceive the market. For example, if a 
company disclosed details about a project, it might have a duty not to omit to disclose price-
sensitive developments and any such omission might be considered manipulative. However, 
on this approach, the scope of liability is too broad. Whether the accused was under a duty 
would depend on an after-the-fact assessment, perhaps according to standards of 
reasonableness, and proof of manipulative intention is not required.  
The better approach is to characterise an omission to act, or delay in acting, when motivated 
by a manipulative intention, as manipulation — irrespective of a duty to act or a 
demonstrated effect on the market. Such an omission is at least a conspiracy to manipulate 
the market, and might in some circumstances actually deceive investors about the true non-
manipulated market price. On either explanation, the scope of liability under s 1041B(1) is 
too narrow, as proof of manipulative intention is not sufficient for contravention.112  
(e) Deeming Provision: s 1041B(2) 
A person who intentionally engages in a ‘wash sale’113 or ‘matched order’114 is ‘taken to have 
created a false or misleading appearance of active trading’ for the purposes of s 1041B(1).115 
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The effect of this section is unclear, as the language is both textually and contextually 
ambiguous. While it clearly deems the physical element of s 1041B(1), it is uncertain 
whether it also deems the implied fault element required for criminal prosecution.116  
If only the physical element is deemed, then the section is redundant. Courts already treat 
wash sales and matched orders as ordinarily creating a false or misleading appearance of 
active trading.117  
If the fault element is deemed, then the section incorrectly treats a wash sale or matched order 
as conclusive proof of manipulation. At most, it is prima facie evidence of manipulative 
intention that can be rebutted by proof of a legitimate purpose.118 Therefore, the scope of 
criminal liability is too broad. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the implied fault element for 
civil proceedings would be deemed. If not, this would perversely make criminal liability 
easier to establish than civil penalty contravention. 
The previous Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) regime provided a defence:119 the defendant could 
adduce evidence inconsistent with having an intention to create a false or misleading 
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appearance of active trading.120 This is preferable to the current regime, as it facilitates proof 
of intention without unduly broadening the scope of criminal liability.  
3 Critique of s 1041C  
Section 1041C(1) prohibits a person from (i) entering into, or engaging in, a fictitious or 
artificial transaction or device if that transaction or device (ii) results in the price for trading 
in a financial product fluctuating,121 or being maintained, inflated or depressed.122 These two 
physical elements are considered in turn. 
(a) Fictitious or Artificial Transaction or Device 
It is unclear what conduct is capable of contravening s 1041C(1). ‘Fictitious or artificial 
transaction or device’ is not defined in the Act and there is no authoritative case law.123 It is 
unclear, for example, whether fictitious or artificial transaction is a composite concept or two 
different types of conduct. 
A ‘fictitious transaction’, according to its ordinary meaning, is one that is counterfeit, false or 
not genuine.124 It probably includes circumstances where a party intends that the transaction 
will not give effect to the legal rights and obligations it appears to create125 — for example, a 
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wash sale, or an agreement to transfer a security on the condition that it is re-conveyed to the 
original owner and the second person does not have an obligation to pay for it.126  
An ‘artificial transaction’, according to its ordinary meaning, is a transaction made by human 
skill and labour, as opposed to occurring naturally.127 Section 1041C(2) provides that it is not 
conclusive that the transaction is, or was at any time, intended by the parties who entered into 
it to have effect according to its terms, indicating that it is not limited to sham transactions. 
One commentator has suggested that this is assessed objectively.128 However, this cannot be 
the case. Trades executed through the market mechanism are objectively indistinguishable. 
Therefore, manipulative intention must be the defining feature of an artificial transaction.129  
If any type of manipulative intention were sufficient, then artificial transaction would be 
transformed into a catchall for trade-based manipulation. This would deprive it of 
independent significance. The better possibility is that the parties must have intended to 
circumvent, or improperly exploit, the ordinary mechanics of the price formation process — 
for example, a matched order is brought about by collusion between buyer and seller, and 
ordinarily creates a false appearance of trading activity. On this interpretation, artificial 
transaction is merely a specific example of market activity manipulation. 
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A ‘device’, according to its ordinary meaning, is a ‘plan or scheme for effecting a 
purpose’.130 This suggests that device has both a physical and a fault component, neither of 
which Parliament has defined. 
To the extent that Parliament has implied that proof of manipulative intention is not required 
for civil penalty contravention,131 the scope of liability is too broad. This would unreasonably 
mean that any conduct, or trade, that has a price impact could be characterised as 
manipulative. This is too broad, as market prices ordinarily, and unobjectionably, respond to 
trading or conduct that conveys new information or changes investor expectations.132 It 
would also be inconsistent with the requirement to prove manipulative intention under 
ss 1041A and 1041B(1).  
If, as suggested, fictitious and artificial transactions can only be characterised by 
manipulative intention, then they are merely specific examples of trade-based manipulation 
targeting market activity. Likewise, device is simply a proxy for conduct-based manipulation. 
As such, s 1041C(1) completely overlaps with s 1041B(1) and is therefore redundant. It also 
creates unnecessary complexity, as it expresses the physical and fault elements for 
manipulation less clearly than does s 1041B(1). This obscures the nature and role of 
manipulative intention, making it difficult for ASIC to effectively frame prosecutions and 
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allowing defendants to resist prosecution by making arguments about textual differences 
between the provisions.133  
(b) Actual Price Impact 
The requirement that the transaction or device actually caused the price of a financial product 
to fluctuate or be maintained, inflated or depressed134 is conceptually unsound. As noted 
above, manipulative conduct and transactions are harmful independent of a demonstrated 
effect on market price or investor behaviour.135 It follows that this requirement arbitrarily 
restricts the scope of liability. Furthermore, even if a demonstrable effect on the market were 
considered necessary, it does not follow that this should relate to price rather than market 
trading volumes. 
Practically, for transactions, the requirement is either redundant or almost impossible to meet. 
If interpreted broadly, it is always satisfied by a transaction executed through the market 
mechanism. Every bid, offer and executed trade contributes information to the price 
formation process. Thus, every trade makes an incremental contribution, based on the price 
of execution and volume of securities traded, to a change in the market price.136 If interpreted 
narrowly, the requirement means showing that a particular price change would not have 
occurred but for the transaction. This is nearly impossible to prove, as a myriad of factors 
could potentially contribute to a price change.137 The difficulty is even greater for a device, 
because it must also be shown that the conduct contributed information to the price formation 
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process or affected investor valuations of the security, and that this caused a particular price 
change.  
4 Parliamentary Confusion about Manipulative Intention  
(a) Civil Penalty/Criminal Offence Distinction 
The distinction between the civil penalty and criminal offence regimes is that the former 
supposedly does not require proof of manipulative intention.138 However, as manipulative 
intention is always necessary to characterise conduct or trading as manipulative,139 no clear 
distinction can be made between the regimes.  
(b) Complications of the Criminal Code Act 
Criminal prosecution requires proof of fault elements implied by the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth).140 For example, prosecution under s 1041A requires proof that the accused was 
reckless about whether their conduct caused, or was likely to cause, an artificial price.141  
The application of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)142 is fundamentally unsound because it 
is predicated on a false assumption that there is a clear difference in the standard of 
manipulative intention required for civil penalties and criminal offences. Reliance on implied 
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generic fault elements is also inappropriate, given the central role and specific content of 
manipulative intention.  
It makes no sense to require proof that the accused was reckless towards creating an artificial 
price. A person cannot be reckless towards a result where the characterisation of that result 
depends on a determination that the person acted with a manipulative intention. Phrased 
differently, the requirement is circular because it depends on a prior identification of 
manipulative intention. The implied fault element is also redundant because proof of 
intention should be sufficient for conduct to be manipulative, and proof of intention is by 
definition sufficient to establish recklessness.143 
Furthermore, recklessness is not a sufficiently strict fault requirement for conduct to be 
manipulative. It is inconsistent with the requirement of manipulative intent. Investors are 
often reckless about whether their trades will have a price impact: this is an unobjectionable 
feature of speculation.144 In contrast, manipulative intention is a fundamentally different state 
of mind. It goes beyond executing a trade that is not justified by the trader’s private 
information and introduces into the market information that they subjectively know to be 
false. 
C Implications 
This chapter has highlighted several deficiencies with the current regulatory regime. These 
stem from Parliament’s failure to clearly articulate the nature and role of manipulative 
intention. Thus, the scope of liability is, on the one hand, too broad, as manipulative intention 
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is not necessary for contravention. On the other hand, it is too narrow, as engaging in conduct 
with a manipulative intention is not sufficient for contravention.  
Artificial price, fictitious and artificial transaction, and device are proxies for trade-based and 
conduct-based manipulation. They should be replaced with a prohibition that explicitly states 
the requisite manipulative intention. Additionally, ss 1041B(2) and 1041C(1) suffer from 
textually and contextually ambiguous language, rendering their scope and the requirements 
for contravention uncertain. The regime is unnecessarily complicated, as all sections 
significantly overlap.  
Finally, the fault elements implied by the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) are inconsistent with 
the requirement of manipulative intention and are predicated on an untenable distinction 
between the civil penalty and criminal offence regimes. Having both regimes is unnecessary. 
A simple, clear and consistent treatment of manipulation is warranted. 
These defects show that substantive law reform is required to achieve a conceptually sound 
regime with an appropriate scope of liability. The reforms will be most effective if 
accompanied by a clear statement of the policy objectives for prohibiting manipulation. The 
changes must be effectively communicated to the investing public in order to reposition 
manipulation as a serious criminal offence.  
The reforms will play an important role in effectively deterring manipulation, maintaining 
public confidence in financial market integrity, and maximising the economic benefits of 
financial markets. The next chapter turns to the issue of substantive law reform.  
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CHAPTER 2: SUBSTANTIVE LAW REFORM PROPOSALS 
The current regime inadequately protects Australian financial markets and investors from 
manipulation. A substantial rethink of the regulatory approach is needed, in terms of the 
substantive prohibitions and their positioning in the wider regulatory framework for financial 
markets. In particular, a broad and flexible prohibition should replace the current overly 
complex and technical regime. This prohibition should be enacted in a Serious Financial 
Market Crimes Act 2014 (Cth), which will publicly reposition manipulation as a criminal 
offence. This chapter describes these proposals and discusses their benefits in detail.  
A Anti-Manipulation Regime 
The proposed anti-manipulation regime will be part of a Serious Financial Market Crimes 
Act 2014 (Cth), as described below. The Act has several components that are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, including definitions, jurisdiction, penalties and other offences. Where 
possible, the Act will use definitions and terminology from the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 
including definitions of ‘financial product’145 and ‘financial market’.146 This allows the 
provisions to be interpreted in light of the existing Corporations Act case law, thereby 
promoting certainty and consistency for market participants.  
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) also continues to apply. This provides for a consistent 
interpretation of fault elements, in line with other Commonwealth offences. Additionally, the 
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Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) will provide for ancillary liability.147 However, it will not 
imply generic fault elements, as the proposals specify the requisite manipulative intention.148  
As a final introductory point, the Act should contain a provision equivalent to s 1041D. This 
makes it an offence to spread information about the occurrence of a manipulation where the 
person or their associate has committed the manipulation or would benefit, or avoid a 
detriment, from spreading the information. This will limit the harm caused by manipulation. 
Further consideration of this section is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1 Proposed Provisions  
The proposed regime consists of four provisions and a note. The first two provisions are 
criminal prohibitions on manipulation. The third and fourth provisions set out circumstances 
in which a person is conclusively deemed to have acted with the requisite manipulative 
intention.  
It must be emphasised that the precise wording of the provisions is ultimately subject to 
expert parliamentary drafting and feedback on an exposure draft following public 
consultation. Therefore, this thesis advocates for the broad and flexible approach embodied in 
the proposal, rather than arguing for precise wording. The provisions are as follows:  
(1) A person must not enter into, or engage in (whether directly or indirectly), a transaction if 
their dominant purpose for entering into, or engaging in, the transaction is to manipulate 
the market for, or the price of, a financial product. 
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(2) A person must not do, or omit to do, an act if their dominant purpose for doing, or omitting 
to do, the act is to manipulate the market for, or the price of, a financial product. 
(3) A person is conclusively deemed to have had the dominant purpose of manipulating the 
price of a financial product if the person intended to set or maintain the price of the 
financial product at a particular level, or the person intended to cause an unjustified change 
in the price of the financial product. 
(4) A person is conclusively deemed to have had the dominant purpose of manipulating the 
market for a financial product if the person intended to create a false or misleading 
appearance of genuine trading activity. 
Note 1: Contravention of (1) or (2) is a criminal offence. 
To contravene the proposed prohibitions, it must be shown that (i) the accused did an act, 
omission or transaction; (ii) the accused intended to do that act, omission or transaction; and 
(iii) the act, omission or transaction was done for the dominant purpose of manipulating the 
market for, or price of, a financial product.149 The standard of proof is beyond reasonable 
doubt.150 The offence’s structure embodies the core features of manipulation discussed at the 
start of this thesis.151 In particular, proof of the requisite manipulative intention is the crucial 
element in establishing a contravention. 
The proposed prohibitions are identical, except that the first prohibits transactions and the 
second prohibits acts or omissions (excluding transactions). This distinction, based on the 
type of manipulative conduct, will facilitate the development of nuanced case law regarding 
the method of proving manipulative intention. In particular, appropriate legal tests for 
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inferring intention from circumstantial evidence will develop based on the different 
manipulative techniques that come before the courts and the manner in which ASIC frames 
enforcement actions. This is clearer than s 1041B(1), which does not distinguish between 
acts, transactions and statements. It also means that courts have sufficient flexibility to 
develop case law that captures novel manipulative techniques. 
The prosecutor has the legal burden of proving that the accused had the dominant purpose of 
manipulating the market for, or price of, a financial product.152 This may be proved directly 
or by relying on the deeming provisions, as discussed below. At a minimum, a dominant 
purpose is a but for purpose, meaning that the conduct would not have occurred absent the 
purpose. If the conduct could possibly have been motivated by more than one purpose, the 
prosecutor must prove that the manipulative purpose was the most significant or overriding 
purpose. It is not sufficient to merely prove that it was a motivation.153 It is not necessary to 
prove that it was the sole motivating purpose.  
If it is proved that the accused had a manipulative intention, it ordinarily follows that this was 
their dominant purpose. This is because having a manipulative intention is ordinarily 
incompatible with having a legitimate commercial motivation. Difficult questions of fact 
arise if multiple purposes, some of which are legitimate, could possibly have motivated the 
conduct.154 For example, the accused might assert that a wash sale was done for the 
legitimate purpose of transferring a security between investment accounts in a single 
beneficial investment fund. The court must ultimately resolve this question of fact based on 
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common sense, having regard to all relevant circumstances. Courts are well placed to do this, 
as they have experience dealing with sole or dominant purpose standards in the context of 
directors’ duties155 and legal professional privilege.156 
It must also be emphasised that, contrary to the suggestion of some commentators,157 the 
accused does not, and should not, have a legal burden of proving that they had a legitimate 
purpose. This would arguably be inconsistent with community expectations about fair 
criminal trial procedures and would undermine the presumption of innocence.158 That said, if 
the accused does not adduce evidence consistent with a legitimate purpose, the court is 
unlikely to give that explanation much weight and the prosecution will not have to adduce 
very strong evidence to disprove it.159 
The proposed prohibitions capture manipulation targeting the ‘market price’ and the 
‘market’. This reflects the two categories of manipulation discussed earlier.160 Two deeming 
provisions provide that proof of a proscribed mental state is sufficient to conclusively deem 
that the accused had the dominant purpose of manipulating the market for, or price of, a 
financial product. Once the prosecution proves the proscribed mental state, the accused 
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cannot ‘go behind’ the deeming provision by arguing that the mental state does not amount to 
a manipulative intention.161  
The first deeming provision relates to market price manipulation. It provides that if the 
accused intended to set or maintain the market price at a particular level, or to cause an 
unjustified change in the market price, they are conclusively deemed to have had a dominant 
purpose to manipulate the market price. This captures persons who intend to set or control the 
market price, but not those whose trades impact, but submit to, the market price.162 It is not 
manipulative to value a security differently from other investors, buy securities at a premium, 
or sell securities at a discount. 
The second deeming provision relates to market activity manipulation. It provides that if the 
accused intended to create a false or misleading appearance of genuine trading activity, they 
are conclusively deemed to have had a dominant purpose to manipulate the market. This 
reflects the current case law on market activity manipulation. It captures a person whose 
conduct, or trading, is designed to mislead investors into falsely believing that there is 
genuine trading activity.163 
The deeming provisions are not exhaustive. The prosecutor can also allege that other mental 
states are sufficient to prove a dominant purpose to manipulate the market for, or price of, a 
financial product. For example, it is open to courts to hold — as with the United States 
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requirement for private enforcement actions under Rule 10-b164 — that proof of an intention 
to ‘deceive, manipulate or defraud’165 is sufficient to establish a dominant purpose to 
manipulate the market. In this respect, the deeming provisions would indicate Parliament’s 
intention that the provisions be interpreted broadly and in response to changing market 
structures, technology and manipulative techniques. This is a significant benefit, given that 
manipulation is difficult to define but manipulative techniques are often identifiable.166  
2 Benefits and Potential Criticisms of the Proposal  
The preceding discussion has shown that the proposed prohibitions are simpler and clearer 
than the current regime. It will be shown that they are conceptually sound and easier to 
enforce, and will reposition manipulation as a serious criminal offence. These significant 
benefits outweigh the inevitable short-term uncertainty and the compliance and dissemination 
costs of a substantive change to the law.167 
(a) Conceptual Soundness 
The proposed prohibitions have an appropriate scope of liability. They are predicated on a 
conceptually sound understanding of manipulation that clearly defines the role of 
manipulative intention — that is, proof that the accused acted with the proscribed 
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manipulative intention is both necessary and sufficient for a transaction, act or omission to 
contravene the prohibitions.  
First, it is necessary to prove that the accused had the proscribed manipulative intention. This 
requirement ensures that only persons with a culpable state of mind can be held to have 
manipulated the market. Unlike the current regime, it correctly recognises that a bid, offer or 
executed trade cannot be characterised as manipulative absent proof of manipulative 
intention.168 A related point is that the regime clearly defines the requisite intention. Unlike 
the implied fault elements under the current regime, it is not sufficient that the accused was 
merely reckless about whether their conduct would have a price impact. The proposed regime 
thus ensures that a person cannot be wrongly held to have manipulated the market merely 
because they used an innovative trading strategy, or their conduct had an unusual effect on 
the market that is inexplicable based on historical price trends or price relationships with 
other assets.169 At most, these are circumstantial factors relevant to inferring intention. 
By insisting on proof of manipulative intention, the proposed regime strikes an appropriate 
balance between protecting investors from intentional abuse and facilitating the dynamic 
operation of market forces. The provisions provide sufficient certainty for market participants 
to confidently self-regulate their behaviour and exercise the necessary business judgments 
required to comply with the prohibitions.170 Market participants can form different valuations 
of a security, engage in price-impacting speculation, and adopt innovative trading techniques, 
provided they do not do so for the dominant purpose of manipulating the market for, or price 
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of, a financial product. Therefore, the regime does not impede legitimate financial market 
innovation. 
A potential criticism of the proposed regime is that it will deter legitimate and socially 
beneficial trading activity.171 In particular, it might be claimed that investors will refrain from 
executing price-impacting trades or using innovative trading strategies to avoid manipulative 
intention being wrongly imputed.172  
The risk of such imputation is so negligible that it is not a compelling criticism of the 
proposed provisions. The simple fact that conduct has an unusual effect on the market is 
never, in itself, sufficient to infer manipulative intention.173 Also, an innocent person is well 
placed to adduce evidence of the legitimate commercial motivation for their conduct, thereby 
creating reasonable doubt about manipulative intention.174 In relative terms, this risk is 
significantly lower than under the current regime, which does not require proof of 
manipulative intention if the proscribed effect is observed on the market. 
In practice, the risk is unlikely to materialise. ASIC’s limited enforcement budget, which has 
been reduced in recent years,175 precludes it from investigating borderline cases. More 
significantly, ASIC and the Director of Public Prosecution have high standards of 
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investigatory and prosecutorial integrity.176 Cases lacking a high degree of certainty with 
regard to manipulative intention will likely be filtered out. 
The second aspect that provides conceptual soundness is that the proposed provision’s scope 
of liability is broader than in the current regime. Engaging in conduct, or trading, with the 
proscribed manipulative intention is sufficient to contravene the prohibitions. Thus, unlike 
the current regime, it is not necessary to prove that the conduct had, or was likely to have, a 
demonstrable effect on the market or the behaviour of investors. 
As discussed earlier, this is appropriate because engaging in manipulative conduct, or trading, 
is immediately harmful. It either introduces subjectively false information into the price 
formation process, or is a conspiracy to manipulate the market.177 A person engaging in such 
conduct has done everything within their control to manipulate the market. As such, proof of 
a demonstrable effect is not necessary, or an appropriate basis, for liability.178 This 
requirement would also arbitrarily limit the scope of liability, as any such effect depends 
largely on factors beyond the manipulator’s control, such as the size and liquidity of the 
market.179 It also means that the provisions ensure that large and highly liquid markets — 
which are difficult to manipulate by way of price impact180 — are adequately protected from 
the same kinds of manipulative conduct as are less liquid markets. 
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Abandoning the requirement of a demonstrable effect makes the proposals conceptually more 
sound and easier to enforce than the current regime. The highly problematic case law, which 
tried to explain why trading with a manipulative intention was likely to have a demonstrable 
effect on the market,181 is no longer necessary. More significantly, since liability depends on 
the trader’s intention rather than an arbitrary or unquantifiable effect on the market, the 
provisions capture a wide range of manipulative schemes. The broad drafting of the 
provisions is expected to encompass novel techniques that are likely to develop in the future.  
(b)  Enforceability 
The proposed provisions clearly define the elements that must be proved at trial, including 
the nature and role of manipulative intention. This makes it easier for ASIC or the Director of 
Public Prosecutions to frame enforcement actions in terms of the required physical and fault 
elements and is likely to improve ASIC’s success rates at trial. This is illustrated by 
contrasting the process of prosecuting an offender under each regime. Consider the typical 
example of a person who executes a trade with the intention to set or maintain the price of a 
security.182  
Under the proposed regime, the prosecutor must establish that the accused intentionally 
traded for the purpose of setting the market price of the security at a particular level. If this is 
shown, the accused is conclusively deemed to have acted with the dominant purpose of 
manipulating the price of the security and so contravenes the provision. In contrast, under the 
current regime, the prosecutor must prove several additional steps, including the construction 
of artificial price; that the conduct was likely to create an artificial price; and, for criminal 
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prosecution, that the accused was reckless about whether their conduct would create an 
artificial price.  
These additional steps do not contribute to the analysis of whether the accused’s conduct is 
manipulative. However, they raise the possibility of legalistic defence arguments to resist 
prosecution — for example, the construction of artificial price, the inconsistencies between 
the civil penalty and criminal offence fault requirements, and the inconsistent physical and 
fault elements between overlapping provisions.183 These arguments do not bear on the 
accused’s culpability, as they do not relate to manipulative intention. However, they may 
allow the accused to escape liability.  
The proposed prohibitions are framed with a clearly defined manipulative intention 
requirement. This allows ASIC to present its case directly in terms of the requisite intention, 
without needing to treat it as one step in proving an objective effect on the market. Courts can 
confidently engage with the evidence and, if appropriate, make an inference of manipulative 
intention. This significantly improves on the current regime, in which the nature and role of 
intention are obscured by the concepts of artificial price, artificial transaction, fictitious 
transaction and device.184 These concepts may confuse the issues and distract the court, 
making it difficult to correctly assess whether the accused had the proscribed intention.  
The proposed regime also enables ASIC to more effectively allocate its limited enforcement 
resources. Increased certainty about the elements that must be proved at trial allows ASIC to 
selectively investigate and prosecute matters that have the best chance of obtaining a 
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conviction.185 This is an important consideration in light of recent, and continuing, reductions 
in ASIC’s enforcement budget.186 At present, ASIC’s ability to successfully prosecute 
offenders is hamstrung by uncertainty about the construction of the current regime and the 
ambiguity of manipulative intention. This may deter ASIC from prosecuting cases that do not 
clearly fall within the core of the prohibition. The proposed prohibitions will directly enhance 
ASIC’s ability to successfully bring enforcement actions. This will boost the general 
deterrence effect of the prohibitions, thereby contributing to public confidence in financial 
market integrity.187  
Critics might claim that the proposed provisions will be ineffective, as it will be extremely 
difficult to prove manipulative intention and thus successfully prosecute offenders.188 They 
could provide several arguments for this. First, there is unlikely to be direct evidence of the 
offender’s state of mind, and circumstantial evidence is often insufficient to infer 
manipulative intention. Second, most of the evidence — particularly trading data — is 
equivocal, meaning that it is equally consistent with legitimate or illegitimate conduct.189 
Third, defendants can sometimes create reasonable doubt about whether they had a 
manipulative intention by concocting an after-the-fact rationalisation for their conduct.190  
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While these criticisms have some force, they should not be overstated and they do not 
significantly undermine the effectiveness of the proposed regime. An initial response is that 
these difficulties are less acute for the proposed regime than under the current regime. In the 
proposed regime, the requisite manipulative intention is clearly articulated and closely related 
to whether the manipulator targets the market or the market price. In contrast, the difficulties 
of proving manipulative intention in the current regime are compounded by uncertainty about 
its precise nature and role and the failure to clearly differentiate the two categories of 
manipulation. Furthermore, the manipulative intention requirements set out by the deeming 
provisions are preferable to the specific intent requirements adopted in other jurisdictions. 
For example, a requirement of intention to induce other traders to buy or sell securities at the 
manipulated price191 or intention to ‘deceive, manipulate or defraud’192 is significantly more 
difficult to prove because it is highly specific.  
A more substantial response is that the difficulties of proving manipulative intention are 
overstated. Courts can — and do — infer manipulative intention from direct evidence of the 
manipulator’s state of mind or from a mosaic of circumstantial factors.193 As more cases are 
litigated in the future, the courts’ understanding of manipulation will increase, as will their 
ability to draw an inference of manipulative intention.  
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In some cases, there is direct evidence — such as emails or transcripts of intercepted 
telephone calls — of the manipulator’s state of mind.194 This is generally a compelling, and 
possibly determinative, basis from which a court will infer manipulative intention.195 
Furthermore, ASIC is likely to have greater access to direct evidence in the future, as it 
refines its use of evidence-gathering and telephone interception powers conferred in 2010.196 
More commonly, courts must infer manipulative intention from circumstantial evidence. 
Courts have a reasonably good understanding of certain indicative factors and can draw such 
inferences when appropriate. These factors include, for example, placing a large number of 
orders at the close of trading,197 using multiple brokers,198 slicing orders into small quantities 
at the same price and sending them to the market at once,199 not seeking to buy as cheaply or 
sell as highly as possible,200 the presence of a collateral profit motive such as a contract or 
highly leveraged futures position,201 and acquiring a large position to allow monopoly 
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power.202 It is also relevant whether the conduct causes an unusual effect on the market price 
or trading volumes that is inexplicable based on historical price trends or new information.203  
More importantly, courts can readily identify many common and well-understood market 
activity manipulation techniques, such as churning, wash sales, matched orders, pools and 
sham transactions.204 If these are observed, courts will ordinarily infer that the accused acted 
with the manipulative intention of creating a false or misleading appearance of active 
trading,205 as this is the ordinary consequence of such conduct. Similarly, most reported 
manipulation cases involve relatively straightforward trade-based manipulation targeting the 
market price, such as ramping and marking the close.206 These clearly fall within the scope of 
the proposed deeming provisions. Thus, the proposed regime effectively facilitates 
prosecution of the most common types of manipulation. 
Finally, it is acknowledged that the proposed prohibitions do not solve all difficulties of 
proving manipulative intention. However, this is not their purpose and it is not a persuasive 
argument against adopting them. Practical reform of ASIC’s evidence-gathering powers, or 
of trial and evidential procedures, could augment the proposed provisions. While close 
consideration of these practical measures is beyond the scope of this thesis, some examples 
are noted. These include bounties and rewards for tip-offs,207 a formal leniency and immunity 
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policy for people who report manipulation,208 and designating ASIC as a telecommunications 
interception agency or an authorised recipient so that it can directly receive telephone 
interception warrants or use evidence from telephone intercepts.209 If reforms in these areas 
improve the chances of obtaining direct evidence of manipulative intention, or increase the 
range of circumstantial evidence available, or facilitate proof of intention at trial, they will 
contribute to the effectiveness of the proposed regime. 
(c) Criminal Offence 
As stated above, the proposed prohibitions are criminal offences only. The decision not to 
retain civil penalties is likely to be controversial and requires justification. It is argued that 
manipulation is best understood exclusively as a criminal offence. This aligns with its 
strategic role in deterring manipulation. 
The current regime classifies manipulation as both a criminal and civil penalty offence, 
implying that sometimes it is only a technical or administrative offence. This fails to reflect 
the offender’s wrongful state of mind, as evidenced by the important role of manipulative 
intention. Arguably, it is also out of line with community perceptions that manipulation is a 
serious crime and that civil penalty proceedings are often inadequate.210  
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The current regime does not successfully distinguish the fault requirements for criminal 
offences and civil penalty contravention.211 No clear distinction can be made, as manipulative 
intention is the defining feature of manipulation. If, for example, criminal liability depended 
on dishonesty, or on investors being deceived, this would be an arbitrary requirement and not 
necessarily related to the harm caused by manipulation. Furthermore, any attempt to define 
criminal liability based on the size of the harm caused or the amount of profit the manipulator 
receives is also arbitrary.212 Additionally, it fails to adequately distinguish between 
manipulators based on their culpability. Manipulators are not solely responsible for the 
amount of harm caused or profit gained. This depends, at least in part, on factors beyond their 
control.  
Manipulation is appropriately classified as a criminal offence. It has been described as 
dishonest,213 fraudulent,214 vile and dishonourable,215 cheating216 and insidious.217 Such 
characterisations recognise that manipulation is immoral conduct that falls short of accepted 
business standards and generally involves an attempt to obtain a benefit, or avoid a loss, in an 
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illegitimate manner and at the expense of other investors,218 which is reflected in the need to 
prove manipulative intention. Manipulation also has the potential to undermine the integrity 
of the market price, thereby causing pervasive economic harm.219 As such, it warrants the 
moral stigma and serious penalties that arise from being a criminal offence. 
From a practical perspective, classifying manipulation as a criminal offence is consistent with 
the proper role of the anti-manipulation prohibition. The prohibition is a ‘backstop’, designed 
to enable strategic and targeted prosecutions of high-profile, egregious or blatant 
manipulators.220 Such prosecutions are intended to have a general deterrent effect.221 Courts 
explicitly recognise this and regard general deterrence as an important factor in sentencing 
convicted manipulators.222 This greatly raises the stakes for people considering engaging in 
manipulation. Instead of facing a monetary penalty, they risk imprisonment and the moral 
stigma of criminal conviction. Educated professionals in the financial services industry are 
likely to consider these penalties as being particularly significant.223 As these persons often 
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have the knowledge and opportunity to engage in manipulation, they are an important focus 
for general deterrence.  
The proposed regime also recognises that manipulation is a difficult crime to prosecute. It 
requires extensive evidence gathering and the presentation of complex factual issues at trial. 
The cost, expense, time and expertise required to successfully prosecute manipulation 
preclude it from being enforced in a fast and routine manner and reinforce its criminal 
nature.224 This probably explains why there has not been a dramatic increase in enforcement 
actions since the introduction of the civil penalty regime.225 Quite simply, it is unrealistic to 
expect manipulation to be routinely prosecuted in the way required for civil penalties to be 
effective.  
In assessing the appropriateness of classifying manipulation as a crime, the anti-manipulation 
prohibition must be placed in the broader financial market regulatory context. The prevalence 
of manipulation largely depends on whether the manipulator’s expected profit outweighs the 
potential cost of being caught and punished.226 It follows that deterring manipulation depends 
not only on an effective prohibition, but also on the regulatory framework minimising 
opportunities for profitable manipulation.227 For example, the continuous disclosure regime 
has played an important role in increasing price formation process transparency and thereby 
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limiting opportunities to manipulate poorly informed investors.228 Similarly, surveillance 
efforts can focus on those markets most vulnerable to manipulation and the firms most likely 
to offend.229 Conduct that is likely to be used for manipulative purposes, such as making false 
or misleading statements, can also be specifically prohibited. Finally, company directors and 
brokers are disproportionately likely to manipulate the market.230 For this reason, they should 
be subject to obligations of loyalty and honesty to prevent them from abusing their position. 
Seen in this broader context, a criminal prohibition on manipulation has an important and 
complementary role. 
The proposed regime might be criticised on the basis that criminal offences are more difficult 
to prove than civil penalties.231 Indeed, critics might argue that the introduction of civil 
penalties232 was intended to overcome difficulties of proving intention233 — primarily by the 
application of the civil standard of proof,234 the balance of probabilities.235A related criticism 
is that criminal prosecution is an ineffective, costly and slow method of deterring 
manipulation.236 
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These criticisms are less forceful then they initially appear. Allegations of manipulation are 
extremely serious. As such, courts will require strong evidence to be satisfied to the civil 
standard of proof237 — meaning that there is little, if any, practical difference from the 
criminal standard. Additionally, courts have limited the procedural and evidential differences 
between civil penalty and criminal proceedings because of a concern that civil penalties have 
a penal nature.238 Furthermore, even if these criticisms were accurate, they are misplaced. 
Procedural and evidential safeguards appropriately protect the accused from being wrongly 
convicted of a serious crime.  
B Serious Financial Market Crimes Act 
The proposed anti-manipulation regime should be enacted in a new Serious Financial Market 
Crimes Act 2014 (Cth). This Act will also contain prohibitions on other conduct that 
undermines financial market integrity, although this is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
Introduction of the Act will reframe manipulation as a serious criminal offence. This will 
combat any existing perception in the financial services industry or wider community that it 
is a technical, or perhaps trivial,239 breach of an obscure section of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth).240  
The new Act provides an opportunity for Parliament to critically reflect on its policy 
objectives for prohibiting manipulation and to articulate them in more detail than can be 
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achieved in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), within which manipulation is a small 
component. At present, Parliament’s understanding of manipulation and the scope of liability 
under the current prohibitions is unclear. The policy objectives for prohibiting manipulation 
have been stated only at the high level of protecting investors from fraud and promoting 
market efficiency241 and are capable of supporting different interpretations of the 
prohibitions. They imply different features of, and harm caused by, manipulation. It is crucial 
that Parliament uses this opportunity to articulate its policy objectives more clearly and in 
greater detail. This will help courts to develop sound case law and will enable the 
identification of novel manipulative techniques.242 It will also assist investors in interpreting 
the scope of the prohibitions and will facilitate their compliance with the law.243 
The current regime is the product of an ad hoc consolidation of the previous futures244 and 
securities245 regimes. This was necessitated by the Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 
(Cth), which abolished the historical distinction between futures and securities regulation and 
uniformly regulated them as financial products.246 Parliament seems not to have anticipated 
that this would result in a substantial change to the scope and nature of the prohibited 
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conduct,247 but this has certainly been the effect of the reforms. This unintended outcome is a 
contributing factor to many of the regime’s deficiencies, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Having an Act that is dedicated to serious financial market offences will reduce the risk of 
this happening again. It will also contribute to generating a political impetus for substantive 
law reform, which may not otherwise exist.  
Introduction of the Serious Financial Market Crimes Act 2014 (Cth) will also positively 
impact the public, ASIC and the financial services industry. Media reporting is likely to be 
the public’s major source of exposure to financial market regulation.248 News reports of 
prosecutions brought pursuant to the new Act will reinforce public understanding that 
manipulation is a serious criminal offence that is strictly prohibited. This will enhance 
community perceptions that ASIC’s enforcement actions are credible and effective.  
This is crucial, given the public’s diminished trust in financial markets and regulatory 
agencies249 following the high-profile media reporting of manipulation and other market 
abuses during the global financial crisis.250 Increased public confidence in financial market 
integrity will help maintain high levels of financial market participation. This will support 
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high trading volumes and liquidity, which reduce opportunities for profitable price-impacting 
manipulation.251 
The Act clearly indicates parliamentary approval for ASIC’s policy of bringing targeted 
strategic prosecutions of high-profile manipulators.252 This will promote a spirit of 
prosecutorial determination in ASIC’s enforcement teams, bringing a renewed vigour to 
enforcement actions and combating the perception that ASIC is a toothless and ineffective 
regulator.253 This will provide an important boost to ASIC’s morale, given the reduced 
budgets and staffing over the next few years.254  
Finally, the Act will remind companies in the financial services industry of the importance of 
having a robust anti-manipulation compliance system in place and will promote adequate 
monitoring of the system.255 More generally, the Act will raise awareness of the importance 
of making business decisions with a pro-active attitude towards compliance. It will also 
enhance the prohibition’s general deterrence effect by strongly signalling the seriousness of 
contravention.   
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has made a sustained critique of the current anti-manipulation regime. It has 
shown that the regime is based on an unsound understanding of manipulation and 
consequently has an inappropriate scope of liability. The regime is also internally defective in 
several respects.  
More significantly, the thesis has advanced two proposals for substantive law reform. First, it 
has argued that two criminal prohibitions on manipulation should replace the current regime. 
These provisions are predicated on a conceptually sound definition of manipulation and have 
an appropriate scope of liability. Additionally, they reposition manipulation as a serious 
criminal offence, while being easier to enforce than the current regime. Second, the thesis has 
argued that a Serious Financial Market Crimes Act 2014 (Cth) should be enacted. It has 
shown that this will elevate the credibility of ASIC’s enforcement efforts and provide an 
impetus for Parliament to specify its policy objectives in more detail.  
These proposals can be supported by future research into practical aspects of implementation. 
It is recommended that research explore the competing policy objectives for prohibiting 
manipulation. It would be helpful to better understand how these relate to Parliament’s 
overarching financial market regulatory objectives. This will enable Parliament to make 
informed policy trade-offs when designing the regulatory mix. Research should also 
investigate practical reform options, such as to ASIC’s evidence-gathering powers, trial 
procedures and market surveillance technology. The result of such investigations will assist 
in the effective implementation and practical enforcement of the proposed regime. 
61 
The proposals advanced in this thesis will form the basis of a robust regulatory framework to 
effectively deter manipulation. They will promote widespread public confidence in the 
integrity of Australian financial markets. Most importantly, they will significantly contribute 
to the reputation of the markets as being fair, efficient and transparent and thus maximise 
their contribution to the economy. The reforms should be adopted without delay.  
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APPENDIX  
Appendix 1 
The following table defines several of the most common manipulative techniques. It is not 
intended to be exhaustive.  
Technique Definition 
Market Activity Manipulation  
Organised run The manipulator enters transactions at successively higher prices 
to create an appearance of active buying interest, so as to induce 
other investors to purchase the security at an inflated price (‘pump 
and dump’). The transactions may be accompanied by false 
rumours of positive news that are intended to exacerbate the price 
increase (‘hype and dump’).256 
Pool A group of manipulators acquire shares, and then trade them 
between themselves to create a false appearance of active 
trading.257 
Churning In Australia, it refers to a situation where a manipulator acquires 
                                                
256 Redmond, above n 26, 922-923. 
257 Ibid. 
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shares and then places both buy and sell orders at the same time, 
and often at slightly increasing prices, to create the impression of 
active turnover. In America, it refers to the practice of brokers, 
who use control over their client’s accounts to make excessive 
transactions for the purpose of increasing their commission.258  
Wash sale The manipulator acquires a security and then simultaneously 
offers to buy and sell it. Although a trade is reported to have 
occurred, there is no change in beneficial ownership of the 
security.259  
Matched order The manipulator and an associate enter purchase and sale orders 
for a security at substantially the same price and substantially the 
same volume.260  
Ping order The manipulator places a bid or makes an offer, with the intention 
of immediately cancelling it prior to execution. The purpose is to 
trigger other traders to react, thereby revealing information about 
their position and allowing the manipulator to profitably trade.261   
Quote stuffing The manipulator submits a large number of orders with the 
intention to cancel them prior to execution. The purpose is to slow 
                                                
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid. 
261 ASIC Commissioner Shane Tregillis, 'ASICs agenda for market integrity' (Speech delivered at the 
Supreme Court Corporate Law Conference, Sydney, 2011) 11-12. 
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the processing of orders, thereby creating uncertainty for other 
traders and allowing the manipulator to profitably trade.262  
Momentum Ignition The manipulator makes aggressive trades for purpose of starting or 
exacerbating a trend and then trading profitably from it.263  
Spoofing The manipulator places limit orders to sell at a price above the best 
asking price, with the intention of canceling the orders prior to 
execution if prices move upward. The purpose is to induce other 
traders to sell, allowing the trader to buy at a reduced price.264  
Price Manipulation  
Ramping The manipulator makes bids, or buys shares, at or near the close of 
trading in order to achieve a specific closing price. ‘Window 
dressing’ is ramping by a fund manager to enhance the apparent 
performance of an investment portfolio.265 
Corner The manipulator acquires dominant, or monopoly, power in a 
commodity and large ownership in a related long futures contract. 
                                                
262 Prewitt, above n 28, 147-148. 
263 Tregillis, above n 261, 11-12. 
264 John L Teall, Financial Trading and Investing (Academic Press, 1st Ed, 2013) 333. 
265 Redmond, above n 26, 922-923. 
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This market power is used to extract an artificially high settlement 
price from short sellers.266 
Squeeze A natural commodity shortage allows the holder of long futures 
contracts to take advantage of short sellers by extracting an 
artificially high settlement price.267 
Rumourtrage The manipulator seeks to reduce the price of a security by 
spreading rumors of negative news about the company and then 
profiting from either short selling the security or purchasing the 
security at reduced prices.268  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
266 Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (Cth) v JM (2012) 267 FLR 238 at [325]. 
267 Ibid at [324]. 
268 'Aspects of Market Integrity' (Report, Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, June 2009) 
7, 10. 
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Appendix 2 
The physical and fault elements that the prosecution must prove at trial under the current and 
proposed regimes is deconstructed in the table below. 
Physical Element Implied Fault Element for Criminal 
Prosecution 
Section 1041A 
• The person took part in, or carried 
out, one or more transactions. 
• The person intended to take part in or 
carry out the relevant transaction(s).269 
• The transaction or transactions had 
the effect or were likely to have the 
effect of creating or maintaining an 
artificial price. 
• The person was reckless as to whether 
the transaction(s) would create or 
maintain an artificial price or would 
be likely to create or maintain an 
artificial price.270 
Section 1041B 
• The person did, or omitted to do, • The person intended to do the act or 
                                                
269 A person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in that conduct: 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) sch1 s 5.2(1).  
270 Recklessness can be established by proving intention, knowledge or recklessness: Criminal Code 
1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.4(4). A person is reckless with respect to a result if he or she is aware of a 
substantial risk that the result will occur; and having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, 
it is unjustifiable to take that risk: Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.4(2). A person has knowledge 
of a circumstance or result if he or she is aware that it exists or will exist in the ordinary course of 
events: Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.3. 
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an act. omit to do the act. 
• The act or omission caused the 
proscribed effect or was likely to 
cause the proscribed effect.  
• The person was reckless as to whether 
the act or omission would have or 
would be likely to have the proscribed 
effect. 
Section 1041C 
• The person entered into, or 
engaged in, a fictitious or artificial 
transaction or device. 
• The person intended to enter into, or 
engage in, a fictitious or artificial 
transaction or device. 
• The transaction or device resulted 
in the price for trading in a 
financial product fluctuating, or 
being maintained, inflated or 
depressed. 
• The person was reckless as to whether 
the transaction or device would cause 
the price to fluctuate, be maintained, 
inflated or depressed. 
Proposed Trade-Based Prohibition 
• The person entered into, or 
engaged in, one or more 
transactions. 
• The person intended to enter into, or 
engage in, one or more transactions.  
 • The transaction was entered into, or 
engaged in, for the dominant purpose 
of manipulating the market for, or 
price of, a financial product. 
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Proposed Conduct-Based Prohibition 
• The person did, or omitted to do, 
an act. 
• The person intended to do, or omit to 
do, an act.  
 • The act, or omission to act, was done 
for the dominant purpose of 
manipulating the market for, or price 
of, a financial product. 
 
 
